BOOK REVIEWS
Jersey Justice. CARLA VIVIAN BELLO & ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT,
III. New Jersey: Institute For Continuing Legal Education, 1978.
Pp. 1, 221.
The last two decades have witnessed a great upsurge of interest
on the part of legal writers and scholars in the history of American
law and legal institutions.1 This concern and interest are relatively
new. As Professor White has pointed out:
American legal history has been one of the most unfortunate stepchildren of the academic profession, disdained by historians and
lawyers alike, struggling to establish itself in curricula and to disengage itself from antiquarianism, largely bereft of distinctive or
2
distinguished scholarship.
The volume under review 3 is a valuable, if modest, contribution to
this literature.
It is an interesting collection of essays dealing with various aspects of the legal and judicial history of New Jersey from the late
seventeenth century down to the present. By title, introduction and
preface, it purports to be a history of the state's judiciary during this
period. This it is not. But when the definitive history of the courts of
New Jersey comes to be written, this volume will prove to be a mine
of valuable information. 4 The book consists of a Prologue and Epiologue composed by the editors, together with eleven essays written
by various authors between 1849 and 1962. These are, on the whole,
well chosen.
The Prologue is a good but rather succinct review of the history
of the courts of New Jersey during the three hundred year period

Examples of such work include G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
(1978); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980); B.
SCHWARTZ, LAW IN AMERICA (1974). Many of the most important puhlications of this
kind are mentioned in the Foreword to G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICA- LEGAL THOUGHT
written by Professor Harold M. Hyman.
2 G.

WHITE,

PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 2 (1978).

3 C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT, III, JERSEY JUSTICE (1978).
' Thus, it is all the more regrettable that the book contains no index. It is to be hoped that
this will be rectified upon the occasion of the next printing. The preparation of an index is a
laborious and dmll task, but the utility of this volume to scholars is seriously diminished by its
absence.
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with which the editors are concerned. The essays themselves present
a varied if not totally comprehensive exposition of numerous judicial
developments throughout the period. This brief review cannot discuss
or even mention all of the events touched upon in the essays. Thus it
may perhaps be appropriate to trace both the history of Chancery and
the development of the doctrine of separation of powers. These subjects thread their way through successive essays, and although each is
extremely important in the history of this state, I present the following observations with an easily verified personal interest in both of
these areas .

5

THE CHANCERY
A Court of Chancery seems to have been first mentioned in
legislation passed by the East Jersey Assembly in 1675.6 Although
this statute did little more than mention the court, it was important
in that the legislature opted, that early, in favor of the practice then
existing in England of maintaining a separate court for the disposition
of equitable matters. 7 This early Court of Chancery was presided
over by the Governor. 8 In 1702, the proprietors of both East and
West Jersey relinquished to Queen Anne all their claims to
sovereignty, and there was henceforth the single Royal Colony of
New Jersey. The famous Ordinance of Lord Cornbury for "Establishing Courts of Judicature in the Province of New Jersey" followed in
1704. Although this ordinance made no mention of the Court of
Chancery, the omission was remedied in the following year by
another ordinance designating the Governor and any three of his
Council to act as the Chancery Court. 9 However, in 1714, upon the
death of Anne, the Governor asserted the right to act as Chancellor
without the Council, and in fact did so act for a very considerable
period of time thereafter.' 0 The Constitution of 1776 seems to have
formalized this practice. It stated that "the governor, or, in his ab-

5 My interest in the Chancery court dates back to my many years of practice in addition to
my years sitting as a Chancery Judge in this State. My views on the doctrine of separation of
powers have been expressed in numerous legal opinions while an associate justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and are also the subject of a recent article written by me and
published in this law review.
6 C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT, III, JERSEY JUSTICE 5 (1978).
A separate Court of Chancery continued to exist in England until the Judicature Act of
1873 went into effect. 36 & 37 Vict. c.66.
I C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT,

III, JERSEY JUSTICE 5-6 (1978).

9 This ordinance was issued by Lord Cornbury in March, 1705. It is reprinted in 1 KEASBEY, COURTS AND IA\VYERS OF NEW JERSEY 206 (1912), and in 19 N.J. Eq. 578 (Appendix).
10 2 KEASBEY, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF NEW JERSEY 501-07 (1912).
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sence, the vice president of the Council shall . . . be chancellor of
the colony." " Probably at that time, the duties of Chancellor were
not onerous, and could easily be performed bv the chief executive in
addition to his other duties. But by the middle ),ears of the
nineteenth century, things had changed. Thus, we find Governor
Pennington, in 1840, recommending that the offices of Governor and
Chancellor be separated, stating that "the increase of business in the
Court of Chancery has been so great that it now requires the whole
attention of the Chancellor and the nature of his duties call for permanencv in office." 12 But not until the adoption of the New Jersey
Constitution of 1844 was the Court of Chancery given constitutional
status. The Chancellor then became a judicial officer appointed by
the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate. 13
In 1871, the Chancellor was first authorized to appoint a ViceChancellor to assist him in his duties.1 4 By virtue of the Constitution
of 1844 and the legislation passed in 1871, much, if not most, of the
work of the Court of Chancery was performed by judges appointed to
this office. At the time the Constitution of 1947 was adopted, there
were ten Vice-Chancellors. Interestingly, the tradition of political
bipartisanship always prevailed in the Court of Chancery with respect
to the appointment of Vice-Chancellors.15 Viewed in isolation, the
Court of Chancery was an efficient and proud institution. But in its
totality, the then-existing court system was the subject of some welldeserved criticism.
Writing in 1905, Charles H. Hartshorne said: "[o]ur system of
courts at present is the most antiquated and intricate that exists in
an\y considerable community of English-speaking people." 16 After
describing the intricacies and complexities of our court system,
Hartshorne placed much of the blame upon our dual arrangement of
separate courts of law and equity. It is certainly true that upon occasion a litigant was shunted back and forth between courts of equity
and law in an exasperating fashion and with much loss of time and
money.
Many attempts to effect judicial reorganization had been made
between 1844 and 1947, but none had met with success. 17 It
11

N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 8.

12 Message to the Legislature, October 27, 1840, quoted in C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT,
III, JERSEY JUSTICE 19, 129 (1978).
N.J. CONST. OF 1844,
art. VII, § 1,
1.
12 7
14 L. 1871, c. 621, p.
.
15 C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT, III, JERSEY JUSTICE 152 (1978).
16 1d. at 155-56.
17 C. ERDMAN,

1935, 167 87 (1936).
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seemed as if any effort to merge the courts of law and equity was
doomed to failure. But this result was finally achieved-rather
belatedly-by the judicial article of the 1947 Constitution, which
provides as follows:
[s]ubject to rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the
Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of
the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal
and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy )etween the parties may be completely deter-

mined. 18
The method of merging the two courts was really the same as
that employed in England by the Judicature Act of 1873. There, a
single court was created called the High Court of Justice; one of its
parts is called the Chancery Division. In New Jersey, a single court
was created called the Superior Court one of its parts is called the
chancery division. It is a little misleading to say, without more, that
the two courts-law and equity'-have merged. It is true that judges
in both the law division and the chancery division have eqIuitable
powers and ma' afford equitable relief. But a trial today in the chancery division varies little from a final hearing in the former Court of
Chancery before a Vice-Chancellor.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The mingling of judicial, executive and legislative powers in the
colonial government of the late seventeenth century surely was to be
expected.19 The doctrine of separation of powers formed no part of
English political thought before the time of Anne. 20 But bv 1776,
the doctrine was well understood and generally supported. It was
odd, therefore, that the New Jersey Constitution of that year gave no
recognition to it. As the volume under review notes:
[iln light of the colonial experience with abuses of power by royal
governors, a central thread running through Inanv of the revolitionar constitutions of the other colonies \'as the emphasis on keeping the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government
separate and distinct, and, more specifically, on keeping the courts
and the legislature free from executive manipulation. But the three

18

N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art, 6, § 3, 1,1
4.

19 C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT,
20

III, JERSEY JUSTICE 5 (1978).

J. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Lai,

2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 7, 9 (1965). This article

first appeared in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
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branches of the new government in New Jersey remained
thoroughly intertwined.

21

This early failure to recognize the importance of a triadic division of
governmental powers among the judicial, executive and legislative
departments seems clearly to have been one of the principal, if not
the most important, motivating impulse leading to the constitutional
convention in the spring of 1844 which drafted the new Constitution
of that year. As background to what was done in 1844, it must be
borne in mind that before that date, all judicial appointments were
made by a joint session of the legislature, and the upper house of the
legislature, as a Court of Appeals, reviewed decisions of the Supreme
Court. 2 2 The quality of this review may be suggested by the fact
that 'a]t no time in its entire history from 1776 to 1845 did the
Court of Appeals ever write an opinion."23
The Constitution of 1844 clearly created three discrete departments of government. 2 4 Almost identical language was incorporated
in the Constitution of 1947:
[t]he powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person
or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise
any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except
as expressly provided in this Constitution.

2 5

In spite of this constitutional provision it is perhaps inevitable
that clashes between the various branches have arisen in the past and
will continue to arise in the future. It is hoped that resolution of'
these inevitable disputes will be made within the letter as well as the
spirit of this clear constitutional mandate.

EPILOGUE
In the Epilogue which concludes this study, the editors point to
two areas where they see a need for further effort in order to maintain the high position which the New Jersey juidicial system holds
among the states. These are the abolition of the county courts and
improvement in disposing of its workload by the appellate division.
Since the Epilogue, the New Jersey Constitution has been
amended to abolish county courts. 2 6 The demise of this last vestige
111, JERSEY JUSTICE 18 (1978).
1d. at 17, 122.
23 Id. at 147.
24 N.J. CONST. OF 1844, art. 111, 111.
21 C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT,
22

25

N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 3, 41 1.

26 N.J. CoNsT. OF 1947, art. 6, 114 (as amended

1978).
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of political parochialism has finally brought about the fully integrated
court system for which many have so long striven. 2 7 Likewise, the
recent reforms largely the result of recommendations made by the
Committee on Appellate Practice chaired by Justice Handler have
brought the appellate division closer to the goal of providing efficient
justice to all litigants.
However, the editors fail to mention a problem which is now
emerging and concerns the Supreme Court itself. The New Jersey
Constitution allocates four important responsibilities to that court. It
must, as a court of last resort, decide cases and write opinions. This is
an exercise of the judicial power. It must also administer the entire
court system, promulgate and revise rules of practice and procedure
for all courts in the state, decide who shall be admitted to practice
law and what shall constitute infractions of professional conduct including deciding what penalties shall ensue for infractions. All of the
abovementioned traditionally "non-judicial areas" are directly related
to the quality and integrity of our court system and are properly
within the supervisory power of the court. The difficult task facing
the court at this juncture, however, is that all of this important work
has to be accomplished at a time when its duties as a court of last
resort are ever expanding. It is suggested that this problem be
studied before it reaches crisis proportions.
In conclusion, what is significant about this volume is that it illustrates and emphasizes the lesson of history: "It] o preserve, it is
necessary to reform."' 2 8 The editors are of the opinion that "for a
court system to stand still is for it to fall behind." 29 Of course this is
true. But in the end, if our court system is to be adapted to the
continuing changing demands placed upon it, what must be remembered by those involved in proposing and enacting changes is that all
reform must have as its goal the striking of that sensitive balance
between the efficiencv of the system and the individual attention and
careful deliberation that must be given to each case that comes within
it.
Worrall F. Mowntain*

27 Much credit must be given former Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes for his tireless and

unremitting efforts to achieve this long overdue judicial reform.
28 C. BELLO & A. VANDERBILT, III, JERSEY JUSTICE 215 (1978) (quoting from Thomas
Babington Macaulay).
29 Id. at 205.
* B.A. Princeton University; J.D. Harvard Law School; Associate Justice, Supreme Court of
New Jersey (retired). The author wishes to thank Catherine M. Curran, Esq. for her help in
editing this Review.

